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Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System
John S. Leibovitz
Consider a slightly fictional scenario.' The year is 1879. Two inventors,
Edison and Swan, are both developing a pioneering technology-the
incandescent lamp. Working independently on different continents (Swan
in England, Edison in the United States), the two men labor tirelessly to
find a combination of materials and manufacturing processes that will
provide a reliable and cost-effective source of illumination for the modem
age. After years of false starts and minor improvements, it appears that each
is on the verge of a breakthrough. Swan recognizes the importance of using
a slender, high-resistance lighting element, abandoning platinum in favor of
carbon as his material of choice. He also sees the value of a vacuum-sealed
bulb and has even found a way to treat the element so that it does not give
off destabilizing gases and water vapor. Meanwhile, Edison progresses in a
similar manner. He comes to appreciate the advantages of carbon and
vacuum sealing. Toward the end of the year, Edison makes one more
significant advance, which puts him a step ahead of Swan. After
experimenting with many different kinds of materials, he realizes that
carbonized vegetable fibers make for excellent, long-lasting filaments.
Confident that he has discovered a workable solution to the problem,
Edison obtains a patent.2
1. The following account is loosely based on the actual events of 1879, but has been
simplified and changed at points to emphasize the element of simultaneous invention. For a full
account of the historical developments surrounding the invention of the light bulb, see ARTHUR A.
BRIGHT, JR., THE ELECTRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY 35-69 (1949).
2. The real patent was U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (issued Jan. 27, 1880). See Figure 1, infra.
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The race is over and to the winner go the spoils. Later, Swan catches up
to Edison, but his efforts mean little now, since Edison has exclusive rights
to the first commercially viable light-bulb design. Over the next several
years, Swan remains on the sidelines, prevented from capitalizing on his
know-how lest he infringe Edison's patent.' And Swan is not the only
frustrated inventor-Edison does not hesitate to sue anyone who uses his
technology. Moreover, Edison shrewdly leverages his initial monopoly into
an even stronger position by patenting a continuous stream of smaller
refinements and process improvements that competitors, lacking rights to
the underlying technology, are slow to devise. Edison thus translates his
development lead into a lasting competitive advantage, which he uses as he
pleases to maintain high prices and block others from entering the market.
This simplified adaptation of a paradigmatic patent parable illustrates
some widely acknowledged tensions in the patent system. On the plus side,
the patent system provides a great incentive for Edison (and, for that matter,
Swan) to invent a better electric lamp. In the absence of a patent system,
Edison might try to protect his design by keeping it secret. Secrecy
probably would not do him much good, however, since it would not be
difficult for a competitor to reverse-engineer his light bulb once it hit the
market. The patent allows Edison to avoid the risk that a competitor might
use the fruits of his labor against him by copying his invention and
introducing a competitive product while having borne little cost and even
less risk. In technical terms, the patent allows Edison to appropriate the
returns from his inventive efforts by granting him exclusive rights to make
use of the invention for a limited period of time.
But Edison's patent comes at a price. Swan commits enough time,
resources, and talent in his effort to invent the light bulb that he can run
neck and neck with Edison, at least for a while. Yet ultimately, in the
winner-take-all patent race, Swan is left with very little to show for his
investment. This outcome is obviously undesirable from Swan's
perspective. Swan may have been just months away from reaching Edison's
milestone, but he is relegated to a second-tier competitive position once
Edison's patent issues. Society also suffers. Edison's patent gives him the
power to set prices and exclude competitors-not only Swan, but also new
entrants-from the market. As a result, society is deprived of the benefits of
healthy competition in the mnrket for incandescent lighting and suffers for
the duration of the patent (or longer, given Edison's ability to leverage his
3. As a matter of historical fact, Swan's company merged with Edison's in England in 1883,
creating the Edison & Swan United Electric Company, Ltd. The combined company was able to
exert monopoly power in Great Britain-shutting down competitors and charging high prices-
until Edison's patent expired in 1893. In the three years after the patent lapsed, fifty new brands
emerged on the market, although this number dropped to thirty by the end of 1896. BRIGHT, supra
note 1, at 107-09.
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original patent to secure additional downstream patents). Edison is able to
make more money by charging higher prices for fewer light bulbs, thereby
maximizing his own private welfare at society's expense.
Controversy over granting exclusive rights to new technologies is as
old as the patent system itself. As long as there have been patents,
policymakers and academics have argued about the best way to balance the
interests of inventors such as Edison, competitors such as Swan, and the
general public. The debate has taken different forms over the years. In the
nineteenth century, a vigorous anti-patent movement used a variety of
economic and natural law arguments to question the value of patents.4 By
the end of the century, the patent advocates had won.' While a number of
economists continued to debate the pros and cons of patents, the basic
existence of the patent system was never really in question.6 In the second
half of the twentieth century, academic commentary increasingly looked for
ways to fine-tune the patent monopoly by optimizing along two main
dimensions of patent length and breadth.' More recently, as high-tech
industries have tested the flexibility and responsiveness of the patent
system, the debate has begun to turn in a new direction. Several writers
have proposed new systems for specialized industrial circumstances, many
of which merge aspects of various intellectual property regimes.'
In this Note, I pose a simple question: What would happen if society
gave both Edison and Swan the right to commercialize the light bulb? My
hypothesis is that the exclusivity assumption of patents represents another
dimension, alongside the familiar dimensions of breadth and length, that
policymakers can manipulate to improve the efficient production and
dissemination of new technologies in society. The question may sound
paradoxical to some-after all, isn't exclusivity the defining attribute of a
4. See Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10
J. ECON. HiST. 1 (1950).
5. Id. at 6.
6. See FRrrz MACHLUP, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM 25-44 (Comm. Print 1958).
7. Compare Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND
J. ECON. 106 (1990) (suggesting that optimal patent length may be infinite if breadth can be
adjusted accordingly), with Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J.
EcON. 52 (1992) (making the opposite claim that optimal policy consists of broad patents with a
lifespan adjusted to achieve the desired reward). Several empirical studies have shown, however,
that inventors prefer trade secrecy to patent protection in many circumstances. See WESLEY M.
COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND
WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) 25, 28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from
Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 793-
98.
8. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2432 (1994); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLIJM. L. REV. 2308 (1994); Lester C. Thurow, Needed:
A New System of Intellectual Property Rights, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 95.
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patent? It may even seem anti-American.9 Nevertheless, I show that the idea
falls well within the bounds of theoretical viability. In framing the
hypothesis, I align myself with a small number of economists who have
begun to evaluate the benefits to be gained by lifting the patent exclusivity
constraint,"° an idea that thus far has scarcely infiltrated the legal
academy." By following an analytical approach that is less formalistic than
those of the economic writers (but using similar basic assumptions), I hope
to extend the conversation about nonexclusive patents to include lawyers
and other policymakers engaged in the continuing debate about how to
optimize the system to maximize social welfare.
My argument proceeds in five Parts. Part I provides a quick overview
of the conventional wisdom behind the existing patent system. Part II
identifies structural problems inherent in an exclusive regime. Part III
makes a theoretical case for nonexclusive patents in comparison to other
approaches to correcting the structural deficiencies of patents. Part IV
offers an account of how nonexclusive patents could be implemented
through minimal modification of the current patent laws. Part V applies the
theory of nonexclusive patents to some contemporary policy disputes as a
means of demonstrating its applicability throughout the innovation
lifecycle. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about how the idea might
be tested in practice,
I. THE STANDARD EcoNoMic CASE
My argument is best understood against the backdrop of what I call the
"standard economic case" for patents. I frame the argument in economic
9. The Constitution empowers-but does not obligate--Congress to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 8.
10. Foreshadowing my argument, I should at this point raise the defense of independent
invention and mention that despite an extensive and systematic search effort, I did not encounter
the one published article proposing nonexclusive patents until after I had completed an initial draft
of this Note. See Manfredi La Manna et al., The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUR. ECON.
REv. 1427 (1989). A forthcoming article by Stephen Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer continues
this line of analysis and reaches some of the same conclusions as I. See Stephen M. Maurer &
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent-Invention Defense in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA
(forthcoming 2002) (manuscript on file with author). Both of these ajii-es present --- al
economic models of nonexclusive patent regimes.
11. Perhaps because of its mathematical, rather than institutional, emphasis, as well as its
publication in a European economics journal, La Manna et al., supra note 10, has remained
relatively unknown to American legal commentators. Only three law review articles have cited
this article since its publication. Of these, only one treats the fundamental economics of patents.
See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97
MICH. L. REv. 985, 1003 n.44 (1999). Ayres and Klemperer's proposal for a duopoly patent
auction appears to be the closest idea in the legal literature to a fully nonexclusive patent system
such as the one I propose. See id. at 1031-32.
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terms since economics is the dominant discourse for patent policy debates.
Of course, patent theory is a highly diversified field. Although I touch on
some differences between leading schools of thought, my discussion
emphasizes common themes rather than differences among various
theories. My aim in this Part is not to provide a comprehensive survey of
the patent literature, but rather to establish a relatively noncontroversial
account of the current system that serves as a theoretical backdrop for the
nonexclusivity argument that follows.
Invention can be broadly understood as a production process whose
output is applied knowledge (technical specifications, production processes,
and the like) rather than physical goods. Unlike wheat, gasoline, or other
material commodities, knowledge is an information good that can generally
be copied at nearly zero marginal cost. Absent any special legal protection
or government intervention, knowledge can be freely disseminated across a
population of interested consumers. (This is increasingly true given the
progression of information technology in recent decades.) Unconstrained
technical knowledge thus fits the textbook definition of a public good: a
commodity "for which the cost of extending the service to an additional
person is zero and which it is impossible to exclude individuals from
enjoying." 2 For that reason, society faces not only special challenges but
also special opportunities in maximizing its efficient production. The patent
system, at its core, involves a bargain whereby inventors gain temporary
exclusivity over their inventions in exchange for public disclosure of
technical details. The standard economic case explains this bargain as a way
of maximizing social welfare by providing incentives for inventors to
increase the stock of applied technical knowledge in society (through
protection) and discouraging inefficient redundancy of inventive effort
(through disclosure).
A. Protection: Providing Incentives To Invent
The protection function generally receives the most attention in the
patent literature. In a classic article, Kenneth Arrow outlines several
problems that can inhibit optimal allocation of resources toward invention.
1 3
First is the problem of inappropriability. The full value of some piece of
unprotected technical information cannot be realized by its original
possessor. Once it hits the market, copies may quickly appear, and the
marginal price for others to acquire the information tends toward the
marginal unit cost of zero. This effect creates disincentives to invest in
12. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 37 (17th ed. 2001).
13. See KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL 104
(1985).
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technical improvements that are exposed to the public. As noted above,
Edison would be reluctant to invest so heavily to find the best light-bulb
design if he knew that competitors could sell knock-offs simply by
imitating his final product.
If inappropriability presents supply-side impediments to invention, a
second problem, indivisibility, interferes with the demand side. According
to Arrow, "[T]here is a fundamental paradox in the determination of
demand for information; its value for the purchaser is not known until he
has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost." 14
Suppose Edison develops the light bulb in his laboratory but needs to sell a
stake in his invention to raise capital necessary to bring it to market. He
might be suspicious of showing his invention to potential investors or
licensees lest he give up his exclusive secrets. This suspicion, however,
could very well turn off people who want to see the technology before they
buy a piece of the action. In other words, it is impossible for Edison to
provide a free sample of information without giving away the store.'5
By giving inventors exclusive rights to useful, novel, and nonobvious
technologies, the patent system solves the appropriability problem.16
Inventors can develop and sell knowledge without the risk that they will be
unable to appropriate returns from their investment. Protection provides a
greater incentive to develop new technology than would be the case without
the patent system, although leading scholars disagree about what conceptual
model best describes the incentive structure.17 Moreover, since a would-be
user of the technology must obtain a license from the patent holder, the
indivisibility problem disappears. Public disclosure of the invention allows
potential licensees to see what a technology has to offer before paying for
it, thereby facilitating a market in technical knowledge that otherwise
would not exist.
B. Disclosure: Channeling Investment Toward Novel Inventions
In addition to providing incentives to increase the stock of technical
knowledge through protection, the patent system serves a channeling
function that encourages inventors to search for new technologies rather
14. Id. at III.
15. Arrow identifies uncertainty as a third trait. He notes that it is very difficult to estimate
the value of information, especially when it is brought to market as an input into the production of
some other good. Id. at 110-11. Uncertainty afflicts the market for innovation regardless of the
extent of protection afforded by a patent system, so I primarily focus on the first two
characteristics in this Note.
16. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994) (listing conditions for patentability); id. § 271
(defining infringement); id. § 281 (providing a remedy for infringement); id. § 283 (authorizing
injunctions to prevent violations of patents).
17. See A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite Holy Grail, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) (reviewing the main theories).
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than recreate old ones. The very same fact that poses incentive challenges
with information goods-zero marginal cost of duplication-also presents
cost-saving opportunities that do not apply to other kinds of markets.
Unlike a material commodity, which requires additional expenditure for
each incremental unit of production, information costs very little to
reproduce ad infinitum once it has been developed. It is possible to
distribute the knowledge to all who might need it, thereby allowing them to
avoid the cost of producing it on their own.
The publication requirement 8 capitalizes on this opportunity, allowing
inventors to stand on the shoulders of their predecessors. Once inventors
gain patent protection for their inventions, they have nothing to fear if it is
disseminated widely, since anyone who uses the invention must get their
permission first. Publication brings subsequent inventors up to the state of
the art, so they can incrementally improve technologies others have already
developed. By reviewing Edison's patent disclosure, Swan might abandon
his duplicative effort and focus on improving Edison's technology. The
aggregate cost of invention thus decreases, in theory, since inventive efforts
are channeled away from redundant projects. This opportunity to eliminate
redundant production efforts might be cost-prohibitive in the market for
physical goods because someone would have to bear the costs of creating
additional units of production for the entire population of potential users.
As noted above, however, there is little incremental unit cost associated
with dissemination of technical knowledge.
II. PROBLEMS WITH PATENTS
Patents do not come without costs. Swan's frustration in the light-bulb
race illustrates how patents create winners and losers. This competitive
dynamic poses obvious challenges to inventors. It can also affect social
welfare. The question I address in this Part is whether the patent system, in
solving the appropriability problem, goes too far in the other direction. Is
there such a thing as too much appropriability? This is another well-trodden
area of the patent literature. As in Part I, my goal is not to provide an
exhaustive analysis, but rather to examine some of the inefficiencies raised
by exclusive patent rights. In general, there are two varieties of problems:
inefficiencies leading up to the invention of a technology and inefficiencies
in the commercialization of technologies once they are invented.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (Supp. V 1999).
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A. Invention Inefficiencies
The economically rational Edisons of the world constantly scan the
development horizon for innovations that may augment their income
streams. 9 They weigh the likely benefits of an invention against the costs
of development. They compare the cost of developing the invention in
house with the cost of licensing from someone else who may be able to
develop the technology more efficiently. In the end, if they decide to
"build" rather than "buy," the patent system provides strong carrot-and-
stick incentives to develop new technologies as quickly as possible. The
problem, from a social resource standpoint, is that speed is not always the
most economically prudent course when it comes to technology
development.
First, the carrot: Patents promise supernormal rents to the first inventor.
Lack of competition following the issuance of a patent can give an inventor
too much pricing power. In the case where the patented technology has no
substitutes or substitution is cost-prohibitive, the patent leads to a market
monopoly and the surplus profits that come from higher prices and reduced
output levels.2" The case of total monopoly is rare because few technologies
have no substitutes. Additionally, other conditions can limit a patentee's
market power. For example, owners of complementary technologies may
have sufficient bargaining power to negotiate the patent holder's prices
downward, assuming it is in their interest to do so. The patent holder,
however, does not need a complete monopoly to earn supernormal rents.
The baseline for comparison is the "normal" profit the patent holder would
earn in the absence of exclusivity. (Assume, for the time being, that
competitive appropriation through reverse engineering is not a problem, so
that "subnormal" profits are not an issue. I return to this point in Part III.)
The patent holder must simply receive profits in excess of this baseline
level. As long as the increase in profit from obtaining exclusive rights
outweighs the increased costs associated with obtaining the patent (e.g.,
accelerated development schedules, or transaction costs of getting the
patent itself), the patent provides a carrot for speedy development. The
possibility of attaining exclusive control of a technology, beyond mere
reverse engineering protection, provides a strong profit motive for
expedited development.
Now, the stick: Inventors not only stand to reap supernormal gains if
they are first to develop a technology; they also face the scary prospect that
19. This line of argument and the ones that follow assume that inventors are economically
rational rent-seekers-not an uncontroversial point. My assumption, however, is that while the
economic model may not apply to certain individual cases, it does apply on the larger scale,
particularly in the modem industrial context.
20. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 172.
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someone else will beat them to the punch. A competitor that gains exclusive
control over a desirable technology may prevent others from using the
technology altogether. Alternatively, the competitor may exact some kind
of payment in cash or in kind. The actual financial impact of the patent on
the losers of the race depends on many factors, including the relative
bargaining position of the losers versus the winners and the availability of
substitute technologies. One can assume, however, that if the loser has
actually committed to developing a technology, he believes that the benefits
of owning that technology are greater than the benefits of obtaining it from
a third party. Thus, the prospect of someone else getting a patent on a
technology already under development is a strong incentive to finish first.
In fact, this defensive incentive may be a more common reason to
accelerate development efforts than the upside incentive, because the
defensive strategy does not require the inventor to pay the significant costs
associated with obtaining and enforcing a patent. The inventor simply needs
to incorporate his innovation in a publicly marketed product or publish the
discovery so that priority can be established over would-be patentees.2"
At this point, the reader may be wondering why I am making such a big
deal about accelerated technological development. Isn't faster better when it
comes to innovation? Indeed, the common assumption is that faster is
better.22 If there were no costs associated with increasing the pace of
invention, the assumption would be well-founded. Accelerating
technological development, however, does impose additional costs. One
example is the incremental labor costs associated with solving a particular
problem. To accelerate a research program may require increased staffing
levels. Yet the marginal benefit of additional personnel may not keep up
with the marginal cost of paying them.
To take a simple example, suppose Edison and Swan each employ two
lab assistants to help with the invention process. Suppose they pay each
assistant $50 per month (not such a bad rate in 1879) to work on their
projects. Imagine that Edison is six months away from putting the final
touches on the incandescent lamp. In the six months before Edison
completes the project (and Swan gives up in light of Edison's patent
issuing), the two inventors each spend $600 on lab assistants (2 lab
assistants x $50 per assistant per month x 6 months), for a combined labor
cost of $1200. Now consider an alternative case. Suppose Swan realizes
that Edison is ahead. Swan decides to speed up his development schedule
so he can finish the invention in five months (thus beating Edison with one
month to spare). Unfortunately, given the progress of his project, more lab
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1994) (describing conditions that can lead to loss of
patentability).
22. But see Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REv. ECON. & STAT. 348
(1968) (attacking this assumption).
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assistants do not translate linearly into greater productivity. Swan realizes
that in order to complete the invention in five months, he will need to
double his workforce to finish the job. Swan's labor expenditure increases
to $1000 over the five-month period (4 assistants x $50 per month x 5
months), while Edison spends $500 (2 assistants x $50 per month x 5
months). Thus, the aggregate labor expenditure preceding the completion of
the invention becomes $1500. So Swan's decision to expedite the
development schedule by one month costs an additional $300 ($1500 over
five months - $1200 over six months).
Is this money well spent? That depends on whom you ask. Swan might
think so because he might recoup his additional investment many times
over by earning monopoly (or near-monopoly) profits and by avoiding
payment of licensing fees to Edison down the road. From society's
standpoint, whether the extra $300 was well spent is an empirical question
whose answer depends on any number of factors, such as the value society
places on having the incandescent lamp one month earlier and the time it
takes to go from the lab to the assembly line. (The longer the time lag, the
more the value of the extra month decreases in proportion to the cost,
because, all other things being equal, future light bulbs are worth less today
than present light bulbs.) Note that while I chose the example of labor costs
to make this point, I just as easily could have pointed to other costs, such as
technology expenditures.2 3 It is important to remember that the inventors'
private costs matter from a social standpoint because they represent
opportunity costs. The extra $300 spent on speeding up development of the
light bulb by one month is $300 that could have been spent on some other
project, say, the phonograph. The investment in inventing the phonograph
might, at the margin, yield more social benefit than an extra month of
incandescent lighting.
Under normal circumstances, i.e., without the promise of supernormal
gains from exclusivity or the peril of subnormal gains due to
misappropriation by copiers, rational inventors will speed up or slow down
invention in order to maximize return on their investment. This calculation
necessarily incorporates the value society places on having the technology
in question sooner rather than later, expressed through consumers'
willingness to pay higher or lower prices, as well as the potential
opportunity costs of the invention effort. To the extent that exclusivity
increases the rents that a patentee stands to receive from an invention at the
23. In fact, technology inputs to invention may be a bigger constraint on accelerating
development than other inputs such as labor, since new technologies often derive from existing
technologies. Edison might have been able to shorten the time to develop his light bulb to a matter
of days if he had possessed a supercomputer capable of running light-bulb simulations. But the
cost required to invent the supercomputer would have been entirely prohibitive given the state of
the art in 1879. See ARROW, supra note 13, at 113 (explaining that information is both a product
and an input of inventive activity).
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expense of competitors and society, it distorts the normal operation of the
price mechanism in the invention market. Exclusivity thus raises the
possibility-stronger when there are fewer substitutes-of inefficient
allocation of resources to invention.
B. Commercialization Inefficiencies
Much criticism of the patent system relates to inefficiencies that arise
after a patent has been granted. Looking beyond the incentive structure that
promotes invention, this line of reasoning focuses on the question of
whether the patent laws impede the commercialization of protected
inventions. The basic complaint is that even accounting for the wide range
of patent doctrines that serve to narrow patent scope-for example, the
doctrine of misuse and the reverse doctrine of equivalents 24 -granting
exclusive rights inherently encourages monopolistic behavior by patent
holders. Patent holders may restrict output and maintain high prices,
resulting in a deadweight loss to society where the aggregate loss of
consumer satisfaction outweighs the monopolist's gain.25 As in other
monopoly situations, patent holders might not face competitive pressure to
exploit their property in as many innovative ways as possible. This subject
has been hotly debated in the academic literature. I will briefly review two
arguments against the monopoly viewpoint as a prelude to suggesting that
the truth lies somewhere between the monopoly and antimonopoly
accounts. The impediment to efficient commercialization probably does
exist, but it is most noticeable in markets with special characteristics.
Perhaps the most direct criticism of the deadweight loss viewpoint is
that it falsely equates exclusivity in the patent domain with the
(undesirable) textbook case of monopoly from Economics 101. This
argument has two parts. First, critics point out, it is a mistake to assume that
a patented technology is a marketable commodity and therefore that
exclusive control over the technology directly translates into monopoly
power in some product market.26 Many patents, in fact, pertain to
manufacturing processes or design features that cannot be marketed except
as part of a larger portfolio of technologies packaged together. These other
24. 3 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 16.02[2], at 16-55 to -62 (2d
ed. 2001) (misuse); id. § 17.07[3], at 17-162 to -166 (reverse doctrine of equivalents). But cf Tate
Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d t357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(noting that the Federal Circuit has never found noninfringement based on the reverse doctrine of
equivalents).
25. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 197 (defining deadweight loss); see
also Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 11, at 987 (arguing that legal scholars have failed to
appreciate the importance of deadweight loss in patent policy).
26. See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1738-40 (2000).
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technologies might be patented by other inventors, thus encouraging
reasonable cross-licensing of "exclusive" technologies." Second, even
when a patent gives its owner the ability to control the production of a
marketable good, the availability of substitutes often severely limits the
patent holder's ability to extract monopoly rents. Inventors can sometimes
"invent around" narrow patent claims or opt for an alternate technology
that does not enjoy patent protection. Edmund Kitch has noted that patented
technologies face competition from superseded technologies in the
marketplace at the beginning of the patent's term, from close substitute
technologies through the entire term, and from imitators as the patent is
about to expire.28 As a result, patent holders may face pricing pressure
throughout the term of their patents even though they have exclusive rights
to a specific design or process. Competition between very narrowly
differentiated patented technologies thus resembles monopolistic
competition more than it does a full-fledged monopoly.29
Another important line of reasoning focuses on the strategic context in
which technological competition takes place. According to this view,
industry participants closely monitor and anticipate their competitors'
developments. Faced with the prospect that a competitor might patent some
essential technology, a firm has a number of options available to preserve
its ability to maneuver. If it has a comparable research program underway,
it may seek to publish interim results in a public journal, thus raising the bar
for nonobvious invention and making it harder for a rival to exclude by
obtaining a patent.3 ° Alternatively, a fi-m may seek a blocking patent on a
complementary technology, thus giving it a defensive bargaining chip
against patentees who could otherwise shut it out of the market.31 Often,
offsetting blocking patents lead to broad cross-licensing agreements or
patent pooling among industry leaders, allowing firms with offsetting patent
portfolios to compete freely with one another.
While these and other theories easily dispel the simple view that patents
unambiguously impede efficient commercialization of new technologies, it
would be equally imprudent to conclude that the problem is altogether
nonexistent. In fact, as Robert Merges and Richard Nelson have shown,
history is full of instances in which the pace of commercialization has
27. As I discuss at the end of this Section, however, cross-licensing can sometimes lead to an
oligopoly situation.
28. See Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31
(1986).
29. Monopolistic competition is a situation where competing products are differentiated but
nonetheless highly substitutable. A textbook example is the retail gasoline market. See
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 12, at 168-69.
30. Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MicH. L. REV. 926, 927 (2000).
31. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 860 (1990).
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slowed following the successful enforcement of patents.32 For example,
before 1891, the nascent incandescent lamp industry was characterized by
rapidly intensifying competition and steadily decreasing prices. In that year,
however, the Edison General Electric Company (the real one, not the
fictionalized version described in the beginning of this Note) won an
infringement case against a competitor based on Edison's seminal patent.33
Edison was able to obtain a series of injunctions that shut down a number of
competitors, growing its market share from forty to seventy-five percent
virtually overnight. Not only did the trend of decreasing light bulb prices
end, but improvements in basic filament design almost completely stopped
until the patent expired.34 Patent enforcement and complex patent litigation
also may have slowed the development of such important technologies as
the airplane, the radio, and possibly even the automobile 5
These facts suggest some theoretical limitations to the patent
apologist's arguments. Kitch's substitution argument, for instance, appears
to assume a linear, stepwise progression in technological development. In
many cases, it is true that technologies advance by small steps, with
competitors vying for incremental patent rights the whole way. As long as
this is the case, substitutes may abound, since no invention will be radically
different from those that precede it or compete with it. However, there are
many instances where technological breakthroughs ("pioneer inventions")
pave the way for a whole new class of technologies that either solve
problems in much better ways than did previously existing technologies or
solve problems no one has been able to solve before.36 Edison's light bulb is
a good example. More modem examples might include breakthrough drug
therapies or synthetic compounds. In these cases, control over an important
patent could have a significant effect on the commercialization and further
development of a groundbreaking technology, depending on the patent
holder's larger business objectives, capabilities, and legal resources.37
Inventing around an important patent may be very costly, if not impossible.
In the case of the strategic gaming arguments, remedies such as patent
pooling and cross-licensing may simply replace a greater evil (monopoly)
with a lesser one (oligopoly). Competition in these markets is possible only
for those companies whose existing patent portfolios give them a ticket to
32. See id. at 884-909.
33. Edison Elec. Lighting Co. v. U.S. Elec. Lighting Co., 47 F. 454 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891),
affd, 52 F. 300 (2d Cir. 1892).
34. Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at 885-86; see also BRIGHT, supra note 1, at 87-91
(describing the history in more detail).
35. Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at 889-93.
36. John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 35, 45-64 (1995) (describing and criticizing the pioneer invention doctrine).
37. John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and
Sequential Innovation, 65 ANITrRUST L.J. 449, 451-55 (1997).
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play the game or who are able to buy their way inside by paying licensing
fees. These requirements may pose significant barriers to entry for
newcomers. Since startup firms often chase technological opportunities that
larger incumbents are unwilling or unable to pursue, the net result could be
to impede innovation in many markets.
C. Summing Up the Problem
At this point, I want to take a step back from the details of the patent
monopoly debate and offer two middle-ground statements about patents
that I hope should be relatively uncontroversial. First, patent exclusivity
raises the very real possibility of inefficient behavior by inventors in both
the invention and the commercialization stages of technology development.
Second, patent inefficiency is situationally complex. It depends on a wide
range of factors, including the nature of the technology, the industry
structure, the competitive position of the inventor, the size of the inventor's
patent portfolio, and so forth. In short, the "patent problem" can be reduced
to a simple formulation: Patents occasionally cause inefficient behavior, but
it is a complex task to predict, a priori, exactly when these inefficiencies
will occur.
Il1. NONEXCLUSIVE PROTECTION: A THEORETICAL SOLUTION?
If patent exclusivity sometimes leads to inefficient behavior, there are a
number of possible remedies. The challenge is to find a solution that fits
both parts of the problem as described above. The solution should alleviate
monopolistic power while accommodating the practical peculiarities of
different situations. In this Part, I rule out two plausible approaches before
offering my hypothesis that a system of nonexclusive patents would provide
the best theoretical solution.
A. Ex Post Solutions
One approach is to wait for problems to emerge and prosecute
offending parties after the fact under the antitrust laws (or allow private
parties to invoke the misuse doctrine as a defense to infringement suits). in
other words, give Edison the rights to the incandescent lamp, but send the
Feds after his company when it leverages its initial patent to gain monopoly
power and squelch competition in subsequent years (even after the original
patent has expired).
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Although this ex post approach has been out of vogue for many years,38
the FTC and the DOJ have recently held public hearings to reconsider the
relationship between antitrust and patent law. 39 The bar for antitrust-style
remedies is high because the patent monopoly is presumed to lead to the
creation of technologies and markets that otherwise would not exist.
Historically, the government has needed to show price-fixing arrangements
with nonpatentee competitors" or tie-in licenses by which a patent is used
to control the market for an unpatented good or extend the monopoly after
the patent expires. 4 The recent Xerox decision by the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals raised the bar even higher.42 The decision narrowed antitrust
limits on the patentee's right to instances of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent
Office, or sham litigation." The court noted that "a patent alone does not
demonstrate market power" 4 and that "absent exceptional circumstances, a
patent may confer the right to exclude competition altogether in more than
one antitrust market."4 In other words, antitrust actions cannot remedy
economic inefficiencies that are intrinsic to the exclusive nature of patent
rights absent some other market-distorting behavior.
Moreover, the antitrust process may be administratively ill-equipped to
correct market abuses in today's fast moving, intellectual-property-based
industries. As Richard Posner points out, these cases typically involve very
complex determinations of fact that test the technical expertise of
enforcement agencies and courts. The legal determination of monopoly may
also be very difficult in rapidly changing industries. Combined, the factual
and legal complexity can delay the implementation of remedies until well
after the offending act.46 Former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky, while
defending the antitrust authorities' ability to do the job, essentially agrees,
lamenting that the process is "bound to be slow. All the government can
hope to do is reduce delay to the maximum extent possible without short-
38. Id. at 449; cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse
Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1599 (1990) (arguing that the misuse doctrine should be eliminated
and antitrust enforcement efforts stepped up).
39. See Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,146 (Nov. 20, 2001).
40. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 175 (1931); In re Yam
Processing Patent Validity Litig., 541 F.2d 1127, 1137 (5th Cir. 1976).
41. 3 ROSENBERG, supra note 24, § 16.0212], at 16-57 (misuse); id. § 16.05[2], at 16-101
(antitrust laws).
42. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
43. Id. at 1327; see also Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the
Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 919-23 (2001)
(assessing the importance of the ruling for antitrust law).
44. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1325.
45. Id. at 1327.
46. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L. 925, 936-43
(2001).
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changing consumers or undermining the rights of respondents." 4 7 The result
is that antitrust-style remedies may be ineffectual at curbing patent-related
monopoly excesses and may even stifle capital investment in affected
markets.48 Given these doctrinal and administrative challenges, it would be
preferable to address the root cause of patent-related market abuses in the
patent system itself rather than on a case-by-case basis after the damage has
already been done.
B. Tailored Liability Regimes
Another way to solve the "patent problem" would be to isolate the
conditions under which inefficiencies can emerge and craft liability rules
that address specific problems that arise in preidentified contexts. J.R.
Reichman has found precedent for this approach in the large number of
hybrid exceptions to the dominant patent-copyright paradigms that have
emerged internationally in response to specific industrial needs. Two
examples are the International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants and registered design protection laws.49 Reichman and
others have outlined proposals for new systems of rules that would impose
automatic licensing requirements, predefined schedules of "differential user
fees," and other liability rules fine-tuned to promote efficient invention and
commercialization of technologies in different markets.5" Under such a
tailored liability approach, the government might compel Edison to license
his patent to Swan and other industrialists at a rate that reflects
policymakers' best understanding of the economics of the nascent light-
bulb industry.
The tailored liability approach, however, suffers from three inherent
drawbacks. First, there is the empirical challenge of constructing situation-
specific rules. Extensive empirical analysis is required to determine
situations, e.g., industries, or preferably, generalized characteristics of
industries, where patent inefficiencies exist. Second, complex liability rules
must be enacted and implemented for various situations. Automatic
licensing provisions will have to be negotiated. Specialized enforcement
procedures will require administrative changes and possibly even
specialized courts. Industry participants will have to pay for legal guidance
through the regulatory maze. All things considered, the cost a.d complexity
of the system could be very high. Finally, technological change will test the
47. Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of
the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECii. L.J. 535, 557 (2001).
48. Posner, supra note 46, at 939.
49. Reichman, supra note 8, at 2453-76.
50. Id. at 2544-55; see also Samuelson et al., supra note 8, at 2413-20 (proposing a hybrid
regime tailored to the computer software industry).
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ability of rulemakers to update the system on a continuous basis. Fee
schedules will need to be amended continuously and new rules added
frequently to accommodate unforeseen developments.
While tailored liability rules may provide a viable option, especially
when implemented on a case-by-case basis at the instigation of industry
participants, they involve a brute-force legal approach. One wonders if a
more elegant and generic solution could be applied across many contexts to
respond dynamically to patent inefficiencies as they arise.
C. Nonexclusive Patents
The idea I propose in this Section in some ways resembles a hybrid of
the patent, trade secret, and copyright systems. The basic concept is simple.
I propose a patent system that, instead of granting exclusive property rights
to the first inventor of a new technology, protects him against free-riding
competitors, but not against competitors who independently develop the
same technology."' In Part IV, I sketch a general outline of how this
approach might work in practice. For the remainder of this Section, I
assume that such a system is indeed practical in order to explain why, in
theory, nonexclusive patents steer a safe course between the Scylla of
misappropriation and the Charybdis of monopolistic power.
Even if the law must protect inventors so they can appropriate returns
from their inventions, this does not necessarily imply that only the first
inventor should be able to appropriate those returns. If Edison and Swan
both come up with the light bulb independently but Edison happens to
finish a month ahead of Swan, it may be wasteful to exclude Swan from
commercializing his knowledge, assuming he did not pilfer the idea from
Edison. If, instead of producing knowledge, the two inventors produced
some nonpatentable tangible commodity-say wheat-one would expect
head-to-head competition.
The problem in the technology context is that it might be very easy for
one inventor to compete by using the knowledge developed by another.
This situation would be analogous to farmer Swan stealing farmer Edison's
surplus wheat and competing against him by selling the stolen goods on the
open market. Such a situation would obviously provide a big disincentive
51. Another way to imagine this proposal is as a trade secret regime with a right against
reverse engineering. Trade secrets typically protect relationships and not inventions themselves.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 757 (1982); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40 (1995); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 433, 438 (1990);
Gale R. Peterson, Trade Secrets in an Information Age, 32 Hous. L. REv. 385, 391-409 (1995);
see also David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter
1991, at 61 (analyzing the economics of trade secrecy); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer,
The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002) (analyzing reverse
engineering as an important "policy lever" in intellectual property law).
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for Edison to grow wheat since he must compete with someone who had
assumed none of the same costs or risks. Society, however, does not protect
wheat farmers by giving them exclusive rights to sell all the world's wheat.
Rather, society expects them to compete with other wheat farmers in the
marketplace by selling the wheat that they have legitimately grown or
acquired on their own. Obviously, it is easier to create a competitive market
for the identical products of wheat farmers than for the identical products of
technology developers. Wheat, unlike technological knowledge, does not
have a zero marginal cost of duplication-but that is a practical issue I will
address in Part IV. Assuming that it is possible to protect Edison from free-
riders but not from independent competitors, this approach would
theoretically obviate the appropriation problem as it is commonly
understood. Edison would face no more disincentives to develop the light
bulb than a wheat farmer faces to grow wheat in a competitive market or a
gas station operator faces to set up shop at a well-fueled intersection.52 His
decision to undertake any invention project should be the result of an
analysis that weighs the project's prospective benefits and risks, just as it
would be for any other type of economic activity.
By preserving rival inventors' ability to compete based on legitimate
investments in research and development, a nonexclusive regime would
prevent the preinvention market distortions described in Part II. Inventors
would not accelerate their efforts at great cost in order to secure the prize of
a temporary monopoly on their invention. They would calibrate their pace
of development in order to maximize their returns-as business people do
when no patent is at stake. This calculation implicitly balances the value
society places upon faster development (i.e., increased revenue by getting
to market sooner rather than later) against the opportunity costs (i.e.,
increased expenses) attributable to accelerating development. If consumers
value an invention so much that they are willing to pay higher prices-
enough to offset expedited development-then the inventor should speed
up his efforts in order to get to market sooner. If there is an acute risk that
an invention is not especially valuable to society, the inventor might slow
development, reduce costs, and allocate resources to other projects in his
research portfolio in order to achieve an optimal risk-reward balance. A
nonexclusive patent system allows the development pace to be optimized
by a rational econornic actnr (facing competition from other rational
economic actors) whose decisions reflect a finely tuned balance between
the value and costs of every specific invention project, without the racing
incentives presented by the prospect of gaining or losing a monopoly on a
technological improvement.
52. Kenneth Dam makes a similar point. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of
Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 263 (1994).
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Similarly, the nonexclusive regime would reduce the possibility of
anticompetitive behavior in the commercialization of technologies. In cases
where the monopoly threat is high (because of low availability of
substitutes), inventors would face potential competition from new entrants
who independently develop the same technology. The incentive for new
entrants to develop technologies would be proportional to the profit
potential. New entrants would enter the market until the profits were eaten
away by competition. Thus, supernormal rents would not be sustainable
over time.
As a property regime, a nonexclusive patent system offers a number of
advantages over the tailored liability proposals described above. First, it is a
generic framework that can automatically adjust to many different
economic contexts. Nonexclusivity not only addresses the substantive
aspects of the "patent problem," but also avoids the second-order problem
of knowing when the system goes awry. It would not require policymakers
to identify situations preemptively where patent-induced market distortions
are likely to arise. In place of complex situation-specific rules, nonexclusive
patents would induce market participants to behave in the most efficient
way possible given industry conditions. Second, nonexclusive patents allow
the market to price the value of inventions dynamically based on supply and
demand conditions. By contrast, the liability regimes require preset
licensing fee schedules that need to be constantly updated and adjusted
through an error-prone political process. Finally, a single, generic system of
nonexclusive patents would probably require less administration than would
a set of liability regimes tailored to different industrial circumstances.
So far, the discussion has centered on how nonexclusive patents would
address appropriability issues. As I described in Part I, the other important
perceived function of the patent system is its channeling function. It is
therefore fair to ask whether nonexclusivity would diminish the patent
system's ability to channel investment in research and development. The
question is an important one, which raises both practical and theoretical
issues. From a practical standpoint, one wonders how the publication
requirement-which serves as the institutional basis for the channeling
function in the current system-could be compatible with the nonexclusive
regime I have defined. This issue derives from Arrow's indivisibility
principle. Once someone publishes a technological specification, how can
anyone ever claim not to have copied the design from the publisher? Again,
I defer this question until the next Part, when I address the broader question
of institutional design. For now, I assume that this problem can be avoided
as a means of suggesting that nonexclusivity could, in theory, lead to a
socially optimal amount of redundant investment in research and
development.
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Although it is often assumed that the optimal amount of redundant
investment is no redundant investment, this assumption does not hold in a
nonexclusive system. The channeling argument focuses on the cost of
innovation rather than its value to society. If Edison, in filing his light-bulb
patent, publishes a detailed specification of his invention, other inventors
might indeed save the cost of coming up with the design on their own. If
other inventors are prohibited from commercializing this same invention,
prevention of redundant investment is the economically prudent strategy
from society's perspective. It is not necessarily the right strategy in a
nonexclusive regime, however, because a competitive licensing market may
cause licensing fees to drop below noncompetitive licensing fees despite
redundancies in research and development. For example, if Edison refuses
to license his light-bulb patent at a reasonable rate and there are few
substitute designs, those seeking to compete in the market for light bulbs
might have to pay more in licensing fees than it would cost them to develop
the incandescent lamp themselves. (If Edison refuses to license on any
terms, the price is effectively infinite.) The licensees would necessarily pass
this cost along to consumers in the form of higher light-bulb prices.
Another analogy to the world of physical production illustrates the point.
Two or more firms may invest in plant capacity to produce some product-
for example, refined gasoline. Although rivalrous production of gasoline
might result in redundant plant capacity, capitalist societies do not
ordinarily discourage the construction of new plants. The reason is that the
cost savings to be gained from combining operations may be offset by
higher prices or other inefficiencies from restraint of trade. In fact, such
combinations typically generate antitrust scrutiny precisely because of these
potential negative effects.53
Additionally, in a competitive patent regime there is a greater incentive
for inventors to license their inventions-thus avoiding duplicative research
and development-than in the current exclusive system. In the current
system, owners of patents on important (i.e., nonsubstitutable) technologies
have only a carrot incentive to license their technology; that is, the promise
of additional revenue through increased marketing and distribution of
products containing their technology. The carrot alone, however, may fail
to provide sufficient incentive for a potential licensor to coordinate efficient
exploiiaiiUoi of a pateiit.5 The main rcason is that the .o-etil ... c..n.r a
stand to gain supernormal rents by refusing to license to competitors. Even
in cases where the patentee stands to gain more by licensing than by
53. Note that when redundancies grow large and there are significant cost savings available,
there is a free-market solution, namely mergers and acquisitions, as long as the combined entity
does not run afoul of the antitrust laws.
54. This discussion parallels Merges and Nelson's critique of Kitch's "prospect theory." See
Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at 871-78.
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excluding, however, many factors such as lack of knowledge, resources,
and even cognitive defects may result in a suboptimal quantity of licenses.5
Nonexclusivity provides increased incentives to license. Competition from
other potential licensors should prompt patent holders to intensify their
licensing efforts. The presence of multiple licensors typically increases the
likelihood that the technology will be efficiently disseminated, since
multiple firms are better able to uncover and exploit new markets for a new
technology than is any one firm on its own.56
A built-in market mechanism thus causes a nonexclusive patent system
to channel research and development away from redundant projects and to
do so at reasonable royalty rates without compulsory licensing. In a
nonexclusive patent regime, licensing transactions should clear the market
at a price below the expected cost of the potential licensee's independent
invention effort. For example, suppose Edison, who holds a patent on the
light bulb, detects that Swan is in the process of developing a light bulb on
his own. Suppose it will cost Swan $1000 to complete his development and
that Edison reckons Swan has a fifty percent chance of success. It is in
Edison's interest to license the invention to Swan at a price below $2000,
which is Swan's expected cost of independently developing the technology.
If Edison charges more than $2000, Swan will reject his offer and go it
alone. By charging less than $2000, Edison is able to absorb the remaining
value of Swan's inventive effort. A redundant development expenditure is
thereby avoided. It is always in Edison's interest to license to Swan because
he will face a new competitor whether Swan licenses the technology or
develops it on his own. The only salient question is whether Edison can
internalize some of the value of Swan's project through licensing. The
presence of competition in a nonexclusive patent system therefore provides
great incentive for patent holders to license their inventions. Moreover,
since the possibility of rival development places a natural cap on licensing
prices that is lower than the cost of independent development, competitors
also have a great interest in striking licensing deals with the initial inventor.
So while a nonexclusive patent system raises the possibility of redundant
invention, market forces should ensure, in the absence of market failure,
that inventors generally avoid truly redundant projects.
IV. DESIGNING A NONEXCLUSIVE PATENT SYSTEM
Can it work? In this Part, I explore changes in U.S. patent law that
would make a nonexclusive system possible. As I have already mentioned,
55. A burgeoning literature addresses the cognitive limits of rational economic behavior. For
a useful overview, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998).
56. Merges & Nelson, supra note 31, at 873-75.
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nonexclusive patents are conceptually located somewhere inside the
existing patent, trade secret, and copyright triangle. I use the patent system
as my starting point since a patent-based approach is the "minimal change"
option. I draw comparisons with trade secrecy and copyright at various
points, however, when the comparisons help illuminate the nonexclusive
patent system.
A. The Independent Invention Defense
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to opening the patent system
to rivalrous independent invention efforts would be to allow defendants in
patent litigation to invoke an "independent invention" defense. The patent
statute already establishes defenses based on invalidity, noninfringement,
and so forth,58 but it has historically viewed independent invention as
completely irrelevant to the determination of patent infringement. 9 In 1999,
however, Congress introduced an "earlier invention" defense into the
patent law.6 A defendant may raise this defense if, among other conditions,
the alleged infringement involves a method patent that issued more than
one year after the defendant had enjoyed (unpatented) commercial use of
the technology in question.61 Although it has not come without considerable
controversy, 2 the addition by Congress of a defense based on independent
invention-even one that applies in highly specified circumstances-
represents a significant step away from the formerly inviolable principle of
patent exclusivity. The move to a more widely applicable independent
57. The addition of reverse engineering protection to trade secret law might, as I have already
suggested, be another approach. This strategy, however, would probably require drastic changes
(e.g., publication requirements) that would undermine the doctrinal foundations of trade secrecy.
Moreover, such a system would probably be unconstitutional if enacted at the state level (the
traditional province of trade secret law). See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that state intellectual property law must yield to the extent that it clashes
with the balance, struck by Congress in patent laws, between the desire freely to exploit the full
potential of inventive resources and the need to create incentives to deploy those resources).
58. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
59. See, e.g., Eastman Oil Well Survey Co. v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 131 F.2d 884,
887 (5th Cir. 1942).
60. First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV.C, 113 Stat. 1501A-555
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (Supp. V 1999)). The provision was an effort to protect users of
secret business methods from patents filed in the wake of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), which held that business
methods constitute patentable subject matter.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 273. At first glance, it may seem puzzling why a defendant's prior
commercial use of a technology would not provide an outright invalidity defense. The simple
answer is that the prior use may not constitute a "public use," which would invalidate the patent
under § 102(b), or may involve "concealment," which would preclude an invalidity claim under
§ 102(g). The case law on noninvalidating prior use is complex and, at times, ambiguous. See
Leslie M. Hill, Note, Prior User Defense: The Road to Hell Is Paved with Good and Bad
Intentions, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 513, 518-27 (2001).
62. See, e.g., James R. Barney, The Prior User Defense: A Reprieve for Trade Secret Owners
or a Disaster for the Patent Law?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 261 (2000).
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invention defense, while certainly bold, would not be completely without
precedent.
A generalized independent invention defense would excuse defendants
in patent infringement lawsuits when a court determined that the defendant
independently developed the invention in question (or licensed from a
good-faith independent inventor). Unlike the earlier invention defense, the
independent invention defense would apply irrespective of the subject
matter of the invention or even the time of development. The only salient
fact would be whether the defendant's use of the technology at issue
derived from a legitimate invention effort. If Swan, the defendant,
legitimately developed the light bulb without copying from the plaintiff,
Edison, or if he licensed it from a legitimate third-party inventor, he would
not be held liable for infringement.
This simple form of nonexclusivity has its limitations. It creates an
asymmetry between the rights of later inventors (i.e., the Swans of the
world) to use or license an invention and their rights to prevent others from
copying their handiwork. While an independent invention defense allows
nonexclusive use of a patented invention, nothing changes the fact that only
the first inventor is eligible to receive a patent. In other words, only the first
inventor can sue for patent infringement. This fact may be mostly irrelevant
as far as the economic case for nonexclusive patents is concerned.63
Secondary inventors cannot initiate patent litigation, but they can rely on
the patent holder to protect their interests by obtaining injunctions against
underhanded copiers.' While subsequent inventors can piggyback on the
patent holder for injunctive relief, they do not have any claim to damages
the patent holder may receive in compensation for infringement. 6 Yet this
purely distributive fact should not mitigate the deterrent effect of damages
on infringing conduct because, from the infringer's perspective, it is
irrelevant who gets to keep the award. One might even make a case that the
ability to receive damages compensates the first inventor for assuming the
disproportionate risk of developing a technology before anyone else has
shown it to be possible.66
63. Maurer and Scotchmer argue:
It does not matter whether all the firms in the race receive patents, or whether the first
inventor receives the patent, and the other independent inventors only receive a defense
against intringement. In both cases, enough firms will race so that there is no
temptation to duplicate after the patent issues.
Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 10 (manuscript at 10 n.5).
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994).
65. See id. § 284.
66. The mere knowledge that an invention has been successfully developed may significantly
reduce invention risk for subsequent inventors relative to the first inventor (assuming subsequent
inventors are actually aware of the first inventor's project). The ability of later inventors to rely on
earlier inventors' handiwork as a litmus test of the viability of a project could potentially impede
high-risk invention efforts (e.g., pioneer inventions) in a nonexclusive regime. The exclusive right
to receive damages might provide some cushion against moral hazard (though there is no direct
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2274 [Vol. Ill: 2251
Nonexclusive Patents
In general, as long as the interests of the patent holder and the
subsequent inventors are aligned with regard to preventing unauthorized
use of the protected invention, the asymmetry between rights to use and
rights to sue should not adversely affect subsequent inventors' incentives to
invent. Additionally, the mere threat of competitive invention should induce
the patent holder to license the invention at a reasonable market-determined
rate (below the secondary inventor's expected cost of independent
development). A properly functioning licensing market would obviate
concerns about secondary inventors' rights to sue infringers since only one
party, the original patent holder, would actually "own" the technology in
question. Licensors' rights to the technology would derive contractually
from the patent holder. Indeed, the licensing rate might even incorporate a
slight discount reflecting the subsequent inventors' inability to sue
nonpaying infringers.
One can imagine situations in which the interests of patent holders and
secondary inventors would diverge. If these situations turn out to be
common, a more radical reform to the patent system may be required. I
avoid muddying the waters at this point in the discussion and suggest a
more radical approach in Section IV.D.
B. Evidence and the Burden of Proof
Evidence is key to a nonexclusive patent system. Without the blunt
instrument of exclusivity to protect inventors from misappropriation, a
more precise mechanism is needed to allow inventors to prove conclusively
what is and what is not a product of an inventive effort. Indeed, in the
nonexclusive realm of trade secrecy, cases often turn on hotly contested
interpretations of circumstantial evidence about the defendant's status with
regard to the plaintiffs secret.67 Once again, our light-bulb example may
shed some light on the matter. Suppose Edison announces his discovery of
an incredible new type of filament by introducing a working model into the
market. Westinghouse knows a good thing when he sees it, so he reverse-
engineers Edison's light bulb and starts selling it under his own brand.
Edison sues, but Westinghouse raises the new defense of independent
invention. How can Edison prove that Westinghouse's light bulb is just a
knockoff? Proving nonoriginality is very difficult in the domain of
functional designs and methods, where the products of invention may have
generic features and lack distinctive stamps of authorship. In the absence of
mathematical relationship between the risk level and the damage awards). Maurer and Scotchmer
analyze the problem in more depth. See Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 10 (manuscript at 14-
15).
67. See, e.g., Sokol Crystal Prods. v. DSC Communications Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 1431-32
(7th Cir. 1994).
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a record detailing Westinghouse's inventive activities, Edison is bound to
have a hard time making his case. In fact, Westinghouse has every incentive
not to keep any records, relegating the dispute to a matter of one inventor's
word against another' s.
68
The solution presents itself if we turn the question on its head. In place
of the dastardly Westinghouse, consider the scenario of Swan, who
independently comes up with Edison's design two months after Edison
does. Instead of asking the infringement question from Edison's point of
view, let's ask it from Swan's. How can Swan prove that he has not simply
copied Edison's design? As it turns out, Swan may be in a very good
position to defend himself against charges of misappropriation. He may
have kept laboratory notes, written communications, financial records, and
other information that would convince an impartial arbiter that he did
indeed invent the light bulb on his own. In fact, Swan is the "cheapest cost
supplier" of such evidence.69 Because he has the most information about
his invention efforts as they compare to those of prior entrants in the
market, it is more effective to place the burden of proof on Swan to prove
noninfringement than on Edison to prove infringement.
Placing the burden of proof on the defendant in an infringement action
must be the bedrock of any nonexclusive patent system. Fortunately, the
existing patent system is predisposed to placing the burden on the defense
once a prima facie case has been established. Once a patent has been issued
by the Patent Office, it enjoys an initial presumption of validity in litigation,
because the Patent Office has already screened the patent for the essential
attributes of novelty, nonobviousness, and so forth. Although courts
frequently invalidate patents, the burden of proof lies with the defendant in
infringement actions to show that the invention in question is not
patentable.7" (By contrast, plaintiffs in trade secret lawsuits bear the burden
of establishing their rights to the secrets in question, precisely because they
are not passed on officially as are patents.)71 The independent invention
defense does not question the underlying validity of the patent as much as it
provides an excuse for a legitimate secondary use. Nonetheless, the
statutory imposition of a similar burden of proof on the novel independent
invention defense would be a natural extension of existing patent doctrine.
68. Note the court's parenthetical remark in the Sokol trade secret dispute that "any direct
evidence.., would... be firmly in the defendant's control." Id. at 1432.
69. This idea tracks the concept of the cheapest cost avoider in modem tort theory. See Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 505-07
(1961).
70. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("The burden of establishing invalidity of a
patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."); see also id.
§ 273(b)(4) (Supp. V 1999) (establishing a similar burden for prior inventor defenses); Paul J.
Hayes, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof. Forgotten Tools in Patent Litigation, 26 IDEA 7
(1985) (explaining the importance of burdens of proof in patent litigation).
71. See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313, 1316-17 (5th Cir. 1971).
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C. Market-Making and Partial Disclosure
The current patent system's emphasis on complete technical disclosure
is tightly bound up with the basic premise of exclusivity. According to the
standard economic case, full disclosure channels investment away from
technologies whose exclusive rights have already been claimed by previous
inventors and into new projects. Indeed, at the opposite end of the
exclusivity spectrum, nondisclosure is a fundamental precondition for trade
secret protection.72
Arrow's indivisibility paradox suggests that full disclosure would raise
problems in a nonexclusive regime. One of the goals of the nonexclusive
regime is to stimulate an invention market in which secondary inventors
license from primary inventors at advantageous prices rather than pursue
the socially costly alternative of independent development. For this market
to exist, some channeling must occur. Without basic knowledge about what
inventions have already been patented and who owns the patents, secondary
inventors would pursue redundant projects out of ignorance or inability to
establish a licensing negotiation. At the same time, exposure to the
technical details of the invention may "pollute" secondary inventors' stock
of technical knowledge, precluding the possibility of a successful
independent invention defense upon which their negotiating position
depends. As long as the publication of the relevant information is conceived
as an all-or-nothing choice, Arrow's paradox holds. Exposing Swan to the
very information that allows him to approach Edison about a licensing deal
removes his ability to raise an independent invention defense, thus giving
Edison monopolistic power-the very problem nonexclusivity is meant to
solve.
The solution is a system of partial, rather than full (or non-), disclosure
that recognizes that all information is not created equal from a market-
making perspective. Such a system would require significant but
manageable changes to the patent publication rules. Under the present
system, a published patent consists of a single document containing a wide
range of information about the inventor and the invention. In a
nonexclusive system, the document would be split into two separate parts: a
functional overview and a technical specification. The functional overview
would exp1lai in ve-r general terms whnt nn invention doe, without
detailing how it works. It would contain basic facts about the inventor and
the invention, similar to the opening sections of the patent specification
required under the current rules (excluding the detailed description and
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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drawings).73 It would also contain a substantive overview of the purpose
and general function of the invention, similar to the "brief summary of
invention" section required under current rules.74 The second part of the
application would be a technical specification, containing a complete
written description, drawings, and claims of novel aspects, as currently
required under the patent statute.75
The Patent Office would only publish the public functional overview of
the invention, although it would keep the technical description on file.
Functional disclosure should provide a minimum basis for a licensing
market to arise. Prospective inventors could examine the public functional
disclosure files before embarking on a project to see if a licensing
opportunity exists. If it does, they could contact the patent holder to obtain
more detailed technical information or to begin negotiations. While partial
disclosure would not provide perfect information to enable a fully
transparent licensing market, it would at least form the basis for such a
market. Since a competitive patent system would provide great incentives
for both parties to come to terms, the functional specification might be all
that is needed to spur voluntary information transfers between private
parties.
Alternatively, members of the public could "check out" the technical
disclosure from the Patent Office. This option would require a waiver of the
right to invoke the defense of independent invention. In such a case, the
reformed patent system would revert back to its nonexclusive mode of
operation for parties that view the technical specifications. Users of the
technical information would be effectively barred from developing the
invention independently. They could use the technical information,
however, to improve the technology and obtain patents of their own. Thus,
the check-out option would allow inventors of derivative technologies to
stand on the shoulders of their predecessors, just as the patent system
73. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01 (a), 9 6.01(a)-(e), at 600-57 (7th ed. 1998).
74. 37 C.F.R. § 1.73 (2001). The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure provides additional
guidance:
Since the purpose of the brief summary of invention is to apprise the public, and more
especially those interested in the particular art to which the invention relates, of the
nature of the invention, the summary should be directed to the specific invention being
claimed, in contradistinction to mere generalities which would be equally applicable to
numerous preceding patents. That is, the subject matter of the invention should be
described in one or more clear, concise sentences or paragraphs....
The brief summary, if properly written to set out the exact nature, operation, and
purpose of the invention, will be of material assistance in aiding ready understanding of
the patent in future searches. The brief summary should be more than a mere statement
of the objects of the invention ....
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 73, § 608.01(d), at 600-60.
75. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112-113 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71, 1.74-.75; PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 73, § 608.01 (f)-(g), (m), at 600-61, -63 to -64.
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currently permits, if they are willing to relinquish their independent
invention rights.
D. Simultaneous Patents
My discussion thus far has largely centered around a system that could
be established through straightforward (but legally significant) changes to
the current patent system. It is conceivable, however, that divergence in
interests between patent holders and legitimate secondary inventors could
occur. Suppose that Edison International, a multinational conglomerate with
a diversified product line, invests in the development of the light bulb and
gets a patent. Soon afterward, Swan, an inventor who has staked his
company's fortunes on the light bulb, finishes his own substantially similar
invention. Swan is a legitimate inventor, so he has the right to
commercialize the light bulb. Unfortunately, Edison International decides to
pursue other business opportunities and neglects to enforce its light-bulb
patent.76 Competitors flood the market with knockoff designs and undercut
Swan, who needs to charge a higher price if he is to recoup his R&D
investment. Swan implores Edison to enforce the patent but his words fall
on deaf corporate ears. Ultimately, Swan shuts down his business.
The risk of nonenforcement by the primary patent holder could reduce
secondary inventors' incentives to follow through with a competitive
invention project. The next time Swan has a bright idea, he will think twice
about carrying it to fruition. Although simple nonexclusivity eliminates the
risk of being completely shut out of an invention market after losing an
invention race, it still imposes a risk on secondary inventors that the
primary patent holder will not protect the invention from cheaters. At the
same time, simple nonexclusivity also reduces the winner-take-all upside of
the invention race. Indeed, it is no longer a race, since there are multiple
winners. The secondary inventor's assessment of the risk of patent
nonenforcement, based on his knowledge of competing inventors and
industry structure, may cause him to avoid a project he would otherwise
pursue were he guaranteed the right to sue cheaters in a nonexclusive
regime. While any specific instance of nonenforcement may lead to cheap
and plentiful copies of the patented technology, the widespread perception
of nonenforcement risk could discourage secondarv invention- thus
reducing competitive pressure on primary inventors.
76. Patent waste is common among corporate patent owners. A 1998 survey by technology
transfer firm BTG International reports that two-thirds of companies fail to exploit their patented
technologies and that more than thirty-five percent of patented technologies go unused or
unlicensed. Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property,
HARV. BUS. REv., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 54, 58-59.
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Full realization of the economic benefits of a nonexclusive regime
could therefore necessitate more extensive changes to the patent system. A
system of simultaneous patents would give secondary inventors the ability
to sue for infringement. One way to implement such a system would be to
give the Patent Office the power to merge substantively identical legitimate
patents. The parties would become joint owners as defined by the current
patent statute.77 Each joint owner would have unlimited ability to use or
license the invention on a nonexclusive basis."8 The joint owners would
share the right to initiate patent litigation.79 They would also share the legal
costs and any damage awards.8" A simultaneous patent system would
probably increase the number of applications processed by the Patent Office
since many inventors who would otherwise not file at all would likely file
secondary applications. However, secondary applications could piggyback
on primary applications once their overlap was established in order to
provide efficiencies in prosecution. Because subsequent inventors would
gain patent rights as opposed to a simple defense against noninfringement,
determination of independent invention would probably have to be
addressed within the Patent Office itself: first by a patent examiner, and
then in an administrative hearing if appealed by the secondary applicant or
prior patent holder.81 Throughout this process, the secondary inventor
would bear the crucial burden of proving independent invention.
Ultimately, the cost of operating a simultaneous patent system might
outweigh its incremental benefit over a simple regime. If this turned out to
be true, there would be two potential policy responses. A radical response
might be to dismantle the patent system and replace it with a less
bureaucratic regime. The function of the central office could be reduced to
keeping records that expedite private litigation (similar to the function of
77. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (Supp. V 1999).
78. See Talbot v. Quaker-State Oil Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 967, 968 (3d Cir. 1939).
79. Presently, an infringement action may be dismissed if all joint inventors do not join the
suit. See Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875-76 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). This rule would wreak havoc on a nonexclusive system and would likely need to be
addressed in the statute.
80. As the experience of joint owners under § 262 has shown, conflicts of interest among
rightsholders would, from time to time, complicate joint patent ownership and litigation efforts.
Potential problems include lack of control over patent exploitation; uncertainties relating to patent
maintenance, enforcement, and future development; and uncertainties created by a joint owner's
bankruptcy. However, these problems can be resolved through contractual agreement. See Edward
V. Filardi, Ownership of intellectual Property Assets- Contracting, Joint Development, and
Alliances, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN STRUCTURING DEALS AND DRAFTNG
AGREEMENTS 67, 75-78 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course,
Handbook Series No. GO-OOTA, 2001). Best practices, such as those identified by Filardi, could
be added to § 262 as a default rule in order to encourage rival inventors to work together to protect
their common interests.
81. This could be a variant of the inter partes reexamination procedure introduced in 1999.
See Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV.F,
113 Stat. 1501A-567 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318).
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the Copyright Office), or the office could be eliminated entirely (moving
closer to a trade secret system). Radically restructuring the Patent Office
would obviously require an incredible amount of institutional change,
however. If the costs of administering simultaneous patents were to
outweigh the economic benefits, the sensible alternative would be simply to
fall back on an independent invention defense as a second-best solution.
V. BEYOND LIGHT BULBS
Thus far, I have referred to a single idealized example-the
incandescent lamp-in order to explain how nonexclusive patents would
affect the market for innovation. To speak of a single, undifferentiated
innovation market is, of course, a simplification. Inventors may compete
throughout many different stages of technological development, from the
upstream realm of basic scientific discoveries to the more applied arena of
incremental or cumulative invention, and ultimately to the market for
finished products.82 In this Part, at the risk of oversimplifying some
extraordinarily complex policy debates, I briefly evaluate nonexclusive
patents in the context of two current patent controversies. My goal is not to
resolve conclusively either of these issues, but simply to give a sense of the
applicability and potential benefits of nonexclusive patents throughout the
invention life cycle and across a range of cutting-edge industrial scenarios.
A. Upstream Discovery: The Case of Biopatents
The past quarter-century has seen major advances in scientific
understanding of the basic building blocks of human life and the ability to
use this knowledge to create new drugs and medical treatments. Many
important discoveries have been patented by private companies and by
universities that increasingly view technology transfer as a new source of
research funding. Since Diamond v. Chakrabarty,83 in which the Supreme
Court upheld a patent on a genetically engineered strain of bacteria, the
courts have repeatedly upheld patents on living matter deemed to be a
product of "human invention," including genes 5 and scientifically
engineered cells that otherwise exist in nature.86 These patents apply at the
82. See Barton, supra note 37, at 451.
83. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
84. Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1636-43 (2001).
85. Amgen, Inc. v. Chubai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
86. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 492-93 (Cal. 1990).
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level of basic science. The protected technologies are typically many steps
removed from any marketable product or treatment.
Proponents of biopatents emphasize that these patents provide essential
incentives to invest in biotechnology research, much of which is funded by
the private sector. Biotechnology research can represent an extreme case of
Arrow's appropriability problem because of the vast gulf between the large
investment required to identify, say, a valuable gene, and the ease with
which this knowledge can be used at no cost by someone else who knows
exactly where to look. Without patents, researchers would be unable to
appropriate the value of their discoveries. Moreover, some evidence
suggests that control over upstream rights can improve the effectiveness of
downstream research.87
Critics argue that patents on basic scientific discoveries can hold up
downstream innovation, leading to deadweight loss. Parceling out tracts on
the genetic landscape, for example, caps the potentially enormous social
value of the most critical genes. Basic patents may have claims broad
enough to restrict not only marketing of products based on follow-on
research, but also the research itself.88 Even narrow patents may prove
overly restrictive if there is no possibility of inventing around the claims.8 9
Researchers and drug developers may have to negotiate licenses for
patented discoveries that undergird entire fields of medicine. 90 High
transaction costs and limited institutional resources can prevent patentees
from licensing to all potential downstream users of the patent, thus limiting
the number of research paths that may ultimately be pursued." Moreover,
patent holders may not want to license to certain downstream researchers,
because of strategic aims or methodological biases. 92 In other words,
patents on fundamental biological discoveries may make follow-on research
more expensive and more homogeneous, and may ultimately impede the
development of useful and cost-effective medical treatments based on the
latest scientific advances. In order to mitigate this social loss, critics
propose a variety of liability rules and ex post remedies, including
87. Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The
Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813,828-30 (2001).
88. Barton, supra note 37, at 454.
89. Rai, supra note 87, at 842.
90. One topical example of such a potentially far-reaching patent is the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation's patent on the primate stem cell, U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (issued Mar.
13, 2001). See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Patent on Stem Cell Puts U.S. Officials in a Bind, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at Al (describing the patent's broad scope).
91. Rai, supra note 87, at 831-36.
92. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1057-60 (1989).
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compulsory licensing of upstream patents and increased antitrust scrutiny
where basic patents are involved.93
Compared to these proposals, nonexclusive patents could provide a
better means of balancing the needs of upstream science and downstream
R&D for all the reasons I suggested in Part III. In place of compulsory
licensing using a predetermined one-size-fits-all royalty formula, the threat
of competitive entry in a nonexclusive regime would encourage patentees to
license their discovery voluntarily to all comers at a reasonable, market-
determined rate. If the primary patentee holds up exploration of other
potentially fruitful derivative research paths because of institutional
limitations (or for strategic reasons), rivals would have an incentive to
recreate the basic innovation and fulfill the unmet licensing need. Rivals
will enter as long as they can profit by licensing the discovery to as yet
unsatisfied downstream users. However, faced with the prospect of a new
competitor willing to satisfy unmet demand, the rational response on the
part of the resource-constrained primary patent holder would be to extend
its "distribution" reach by entering into agreements with technology
transfer firms that have the capability to license the innovation to the widest
possible market of users. The primary patent holder's desire to capture
some of the surplus value that would otherwise go to rival inventors should
stimulate the development of a viable secondary licensing market, ensuring
that the upstream discovery finds its way to the socially optimal number of
downstream users willing to pay reasonable royalties for its use.
One of the greatest challenges in constructing biotechnology patent
policy follows from the difficulty of predicting, a priori, the social value of
any given biopatent. One patented gene may hold the key to an array of
essential cancer-fighting medicines. Another may prove to have no medical
utility whatsoever. One process for developing human stem cells may
remain the best available method over the life of a twenty-year term.
Another may become obsolete as soon as the ink is dry on the patent
application. In many cases, a patent may lie in the middle of this value
spectrum, maintaining its value for a few years before some new discovery
eclipses it.
Nonexclusive patents provide a dynamic pricing mechanism that allows
scientists and investors to receive a fair return on their initial investment,
withont ove.rcompensating them at society's expense if the discovery turns
out to have fundamental medical importance over the long term. The
93. See Barton, supra note 37, at 458-66 (suggesting an antitrust approach); Eisenberg, supra
note 92, at 1078 (arguing for a limited experimental-use exception in the case of scientific claim
validation and compulsory licensing for follow-on research); Gitter, supra note 84, at 1678-90
(proposing a compulsory license regime with a broader exemption for experimental use); Rai,
supra note 87, at 838-53 (arguing for narrower PTO guidelines and stepped-up antitrust
enforcement, and against compulsory licensing).
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reason, as I noted in Part II, is that R&D costs for any given project may
decline over time as the underlying technology of invention advances. As
the expected cost of independent invention decreases, the pressure on
primary patentees facing the threat of competitive entry to lower prices
increases. As a consequence, in a nonexclusive system, the longer an
upstream patent retains its value for downstream users, the greater the
pressure on the patentee to license at lower prices. At the limit, where some
discovery (e.g., stem cells) turns out to form the basis for a whole new
scientific field and the upstream patent holder continues to charge
exorbitant prices, downstream industry participants may decide to back a
rival research program qualified to raise the independent invention defense
on the condition that it make the technology available for public use at little
or no cost.
B. Cumulative Systems Development: The Case of Software Patents
Although computer software, like biotechnology, is an innovation-
driven industry, software innovation tends to be more cumulative and
informal. While some portion of computer programming involves abstract
development of discrete concepts by formally trained professionals (and
can be properly termed "computer science"), a large proportion involves
practical artistry that occupies a downstream realm far removed from the
basic enabling inventions. Programmers commonly combine and recombine
software design elements that have worked in other contexts.94 Compared to
inventors in other technical fields, they more often rely on informal modes
of information dissemination rather than on professional journals, patent
disclosures, and the like. Unattributed ideas often flow freely within the
programming community. Programmers tend to pick up technical know-
how from many different sources as they work their way through various
technical problems.95 Unconstrained by physical manufacturing processes,
software technologies can evolve at a very rapid pace.
Traditionally, computer software has been protected against
competitive appropriation through copyright or trade secrecy. However, as
the software industry has matured, its products have grown more complex,
and the financial stakes have increased, limitations of these regimes have
become more apparent. Trade secrecy does nothing to stop the
appropriation of technical knowledge through reverse engineering of a
program.96 While copyright protects against literal copying of code, it does
not adequately cover nonliteral appropriation of basic software
94. Samuelson et al., supra note 8, at 2330-3 1.
95. Id. at 2329-30.
96. See supra note 51.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2284 [Vol. 111: 2251
Nonexclusive Patents
functionality. 97 Consequently, developers have turned to the patent system
for additional protection of their valuable investment in software
technology.
Courts have increasingly accommodated their wishes.98 In the 1970s,
courts repeatedly viewed software as mathematical algorithms, which,
under Gottschalk v. Benson,99 could not be patented. Starting with Diamond
v. Diehr in 1981, '00 however, courts began to uphold software patents as
long as they described inventions as processes instantiated in physical
machines rather than as purely logical methods. By the 1990s courts
decreased the formal barriers to software patents in a string of cases
culminating in the Federal Circuit's State Street decision, which held that
algorithmic processes are patentable as long as they produce a "useful,
concrete, and tangible result." 101 A surge in software patents has paralleled
this history. As many as 100,000 software patents may now be in force in
the United States, with thousands more issuing every year." 2
Despite the increasing prevalence of software patents, the peculiar
characteristics of the software industry raise at least two important
problems, both involving transaction costs. First, it can be costly-
sometimes impossible-to pinpoint the original source of any given
software improvement. The dispersion of downstream technical knowledge,
combined with the "black box" nature of compiled code, can make prior
art searches difficult. These search costs can lead to uncertainty, excess
litigation, and, in the worst case, enforceable patents on inventions of
questionable (but not disprovable) novelty. Second, the fast pace of
software advances may limit the potential economic benefit of information
channeling through the formal apparatus of the patent system. Development
often outpaces the patent system's ability to publish technical information.
By the time a patent applicant has drafted a formal application and
submitted it to the Patent Office, and the publication window passes,
several other developers may have made the same technological advance.
Even for the rare programmer who religiously searches the patent database
before starting a coding session, the publication of a relevant patent may
come too late to do any good. Enforcement of exclusive rights may shut
down independent invention even when independent invention is more
cost- and time-efficient than relying on a prior inventor's patent disclosure.
97. Samuelson et al., supra note 8, at 2343-56.
98. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 7-11 (2001) (describing the history of software patents).
99. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
100. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
101. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed, Cir.
1998).
102. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 98, at 11.
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By providing strong protection against misappropriation while
preserving independent developers' ability to maneuver and defend
themselves against overly restrictive software patents, nonexclusive patents
would provide an elegant solution to the software dilemma. In contrast to
some proposed tailored liability approaches,' 0 3 nonexclusive patents would
not require special rules or pricing schedules unique to the software
industry. Rather, the same nonexclusive system that would apply to other
industries would also apply to the software business. Developers could
apply for patents to protect innovations, as they do now. The risks of error
in prosecution, however, would be minimized because independent
invention (or derivation from an independent invention) would provide a
defense to infringement actions based upon spurious patents. Nonexclusive
patents would allow independent invention to continue to flourish as long
as industry participants determine that it is cheaper (or faster) to build than
to search for a patented technology. By protecting incentives to innovate
while preserving free competition among legitimate competitors,
nonexclusive patents should lead to lower prices, increased innovation, and
more open technology access than the current patent system."°
In presenting the tough cases of biotechnology and software, my goal
has been to show the versatility of nonexclusive patents. Part of the appeal
of a nonexclusive patent system is that it would be flexible enough to adapt
to both these outlier situations as well as more conventional invention
scenarios.
CONCLUSION
To answer the question posed at the outset of this Note, I believe that
society would be better off by giving both Edison and Swan rights to
commercialize the light bulb. A nonexclusive patent system would be more
economically efficient than an exclusive patent system. In theory,
nonexclusive patents should generally improve social welfare across a
range of invention scenarios where competition leads to price competition
among rival patent holders or increased licensing at reasonable market
rates. A nonexclusive system could be constructed through modifications to
the existing patent regime. It could have far-reaching effects in many stages
of technological development and across many industries.
At this point, of course, the idea is merely a hypothesis. Following
further theoretical development, the next step would be to test this
hypothesis with willing participants in an appropriate microcosmic
103. E.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 8, at 2413-20.
104. These benefits should be particularly pronounced in situations where a patented
technology produces network externalities that give the patent holder disproportionate market
power.
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industrial setting. Ideally, the industry context would be one where patents
currently lead to monopoly power due to lack of substitutes. A subfield of
biotechnology might be a good candidate. In conducting such an
experiment, we would want to know first whether the system I have
described-or some other "preferred embodiment" of a nonexclusive
patent regime-is technically feasible. If it is feasible, we would want to
conduct a positive analysis of its economic impact in comparison to the
current exclusive patent regime. Although I have primarily approached this
issue from the patent angle, we might also want to know how nonexclusive
patents would fare in an industrial context that currently favors trade
secrecy. (For example, would a partial disclosure system lead to more
efficient channeling of information that is presently kept secret?)
For present purposes, however, I will be satisfied if, in the spirit of
Edison and Swan, I have been able to offer a novel source of illumination in
an occasionally dusky area of the law.
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